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Abstract
In this work, we consider one challenging training time attack by modifying training data with
bounded perturbation, hoping to manipulate the behavior (both targeted or non-targeted) of any
corresponding trained classifier during test time when facing clean samples. To achieve this, we
proposed to use an auto-encoder-like network to generate the pertubation on the training data
paired with one differentiable system acting as the imaginary victim classifier. The perturbation
generator will learn to update its weights by watching the training procedure of the imaginary
classifier in order to produce the most harmful and imperceivable noise which in turn will lead
the lowest generalization power for the victim classifier. This can be formulated into a non-linear
equality constrained optimization problem. Unlike GANs, solving such problem is computationally
challenging, we then proposed a simple yet effective procedure to decouple the alternating updates
for the two networks for stability. The method proposed in this paper can be easily extended to
the label specific setting where the attacker can manipulate the predictions of the victim classifiers
according to some predefined rules rather than only making wrong predictions. Experiments on
various datasets including CIFAR-10 and a reduced version of ImageNet confirmed the effectiveness
of the proposed method and empirical results showed that, such bounded perturbation have good
transferability regardless of which classifier the victim is actually using on image data.
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1. Introduction
How to modify the training data with bounded transferable perturbation that can lead to the
largest generalization gap? In other words, we consider the task of adding imperceivable noises
to the training data, hoping to maximally confuse any corresponding classifier trained on it by
letting it to make the wrong predictions as much as possible when facing clean test data.
To achieve the above motivation, we defined a deep encoder-decoder-like network to generate such
perturbations which takes the clean samples as input and outputs the corresponding adversarial
noises in the same sample space. Such bounded noises is then added to the training data.
Meanwhile, we use an imaginary neural network as the victim classifier, and the goal here is to
train both networks simultaneously by letting the autoencoder to update its weights that can
cause the lowest test accuracy for the victim classifier. Instead of reconstruction error as learning
objective for traditional autoencoders, here we formulated the problem into a non-linear equality
constrained optimization problem. Unlike GANs [1], such optimization problem is much harder to
solve and a direct implementation of alternating updates will lead to unstable result. Inspired by
some common techniques in reinforcement learning such as introducing a separate record tracking
network like target-nets to stabilize Q-learning [2], we proposed a similar approach by decoupling
the training procedure by introducing the pseudo-update steps when training the autoencoder.
By doing so, the optimization procedure is much stable in practice.
A similar setting is data poisoning [3] in the security community but the goal is quite different with
this work. The main goal here is to examine the robustness of training data by adding bounded
noises in order to reveal some intriguing properties of neural networks, whereas data poisoning
focus on the restriction that only few training data is allowed to change. Actually, having full
control of training data (instead of changing a few) is a realistic assumption, for instance, in some
applications an agent may agree to release some internal data for peer assessment or academic
research, but does not like to enable the data receiver to build a model which performs well on
real test data; this can be realized by applying such adversarial noises before the data release.
The other contribution of this work is that, such formalization can be easily extended to the label
specific case, where one wants to specifically fool the classifier of recognizing one input pattern into
a specifically predefined class, rather than making a wrong prediction only. Finally, experimental
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results showed that, the learned noises is effective and robust to other machine learning models
with different structure or even different types such as Random Forest [4] or Support Vector
Machine(SVM) [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First, we will give some more related works followed
by the formalization for the proposed problem. Then, the optimization procedure is described
followed by a discussion of some variants of the task. Experimental results are presented and
finally conclusion and future works are discussed.
2. Related Works
One subject which closely relates to our work is data poisoning. The task of data poisoning dates
back to the pre-deep learning times. For instance, there has been some research on poisoning the
classical models including SVM [6], Linear Regression [7] and Naive Bayes [8] which basically
transform the poisoning task into a convex optimization problem. Poisoning for deep models,
however, is a more challenging one. Kon et.al. [9] first proposed the possibility of poisoning deep
models via the influence function to derive adversarial training examples. Currently, there have
been some popular approaches to data poisoning. For instance, sample specific poisoning aims to
manipulate the model’s behavior on some particular test samples. [10, 11, 12]. On the other hand,
general poison attack aiming to reduce the performance on cleaned whole unseen test set [9, 3]. As
explained in the previous section, one of the differences with data poisoning is that the poisoning
task mainly focusing on modifying as few samples as possible whereas our work focus on adding
bounded noises as small as possible. In addition, our noise adding scheme can be scaled to much
larger datasets with good transferability.
Another related subject is adversarial examples or testing time attacks, which refers to the case of
presenting malicious testing samples to an already trained classifier. Since the classifier is given
and fixed, there is no two-party game involved. Researches showed deep model is very sensitive
to such adversarial examples due to the high-dimensionality of the input data and the linearity
nature inside deep neural networks [13]. Some recent works showed such adversarial examples
also exists in the physical world [14, 15], making it an important security and safety issue when
designing high-stakes machine learning systems in an open and dynamic environment. Our work
can be regarded as training time analogy of adversarial examples.
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There have been some works on explaining the effectiveness of adversarial examples. The work
in [16] proposed that it is the linearity inside neural networks that makes the decision boundary
vulnerable in high dimensional space. Although beyond the scope of this paper, we tested several
hypotheses on explaining the effectiveness of training time adversarial noises.
3. The proposed method
Consider the standard supervised learning procedure for classification where one wants learn
the mapping fθ : X → {0, 1}K from data where K is the number of classes being predicted.
To learn the optimal parameters θ∗, a loss function such as cross-entropy for classification
L(fθ(x), y) : Rk ×Z+ → R+ on training data is often defined and empirical risk minimization [17]
can thus be applied, that is, one want to minimize the loss function on training data as:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
∑
(x,y)∼D
[L(fθ(x), y)] (1)
Figure 1: An overview for learning to confuse: Decoupling the alternating update for fθ and gξ
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Algorithm 1: Deep Confuse
Input: Training data D, number of trials T , max iteration for training a classification model
maxiter, learning rate of classification model αf ,learning rate of the Noise Generator αg,
batch size b
Output: Learned Noise Generator gξ
1 ξ ← RandomInit()
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 θ0 ← RandomInit()
4 L← empty list
5 // Update fθ while keeping gξ fixed
6 for i = 0 to maxiter do
7 //Sample a mini-batch of training data
8 (xi, yi) ∼ D
9 L.append((θi, xi, yi))
10 xadversariali ← xi + gξ(xi)
11 // Update model fθ by SGD
12 θi+1 ← θi − αf∇θiL(fθi(xadversariali ), yi)
13 end
14 // update gξ via a pseudo-update of fθ
15 for i = 0 to maxiter do
16 (θi, xi, yi)← L[i]
17 //pseudo-update fθ over the current adversarial data
18 θ′ ← θi − αf∇θiL(fθi(xi + gξ(xi)), yi)
19 // Update gξ over clean data
20 ξ ← ξ + αg∇ξL(fθ′(x), y)
21 end
22 end
23 return gξ
When fθ is a differentiable system such as neural networks, stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [18]
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or its variants can be applied by updating θ via gradient descent
θ ← θ − α∇θL(fθ(x), y), (2)
where α refers to the learning rate.
The goal for this work is to perturb the training data by adding artificially imperceivable noise
such that during testing time, the classifier’s behavior will be dramatically different on the clean
test-set.
To formulate this, we first define a noise generator gξ : X → X which takes one training sample x
in X and transform it into an imperceivable noise pattern in the same space X . For image data,
such constraint can be formulated as:
∀x, ‖gξ(x)‖∞ ≤  (3)
Here, the  controls the perturbation strength which is a common practice in adversarial set-
tings [13]. In this work, we choose the noise generator gξ to be an encoder-decoder neural network
and the activation for the final layer is defined to be: · (tanh(·)) to facilitate the constraint (3).
With the above motivation and notations, we can then formalize the task into the following
optimization problem as:
max
ξ
∑
(x,y)∼D
[L(fθ∗(ξ)(x), y)],
s.t. θ∗(ξ) = arg min
θ
∑
(x,y)∼D
[L(fθ(x+ gξ(x)), y)]
(4)
In other words, every possible configuration ξ is paired with one classifier fθ∗(ξ) trained on the
corresponding modified data, the goal here is to find a noise generator gξ∗ such that the paired
classifier fθ∗(ξ∗) to have the worst performance on the cleaned test set, compared with all the
other possible ξ.
This non-convex optimization problem is challenging, especially due to the nonlinear equality
constraint. Here we propose an alternating update procedure using some commonly accepted
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tricks in reinforcement learning for stability [2] which is simple yet effective in practice.
Algorithm 2: Mem-Efficient Deep Confuse
Input: Training data D, number of trials T , max iteration for training a classification model
maxiter, learning rate of classification model αf ,learning rate of the Noise Generator αg,
batch size b
Output: Learned Noise Generator gξ
1 ξ ← RandomInit()
2 g′ξ ← gξ.copy()
3 for t = 1 to T do
4 θ0 ← RandomInit()
5 for i = 0 to maxiter do
6 //Sample a mini-batch
7 (xi, yi) ∼ D
8 // Update g′ξ using current fθ
9 θ′ ← θi − αf∇θiL(fθi(xi + g′ξ(xi)), yi)
10 ξ′ ← ξ′ + αg∇ξ′L(fθ′(x), y)
11 // Update fθ by SGD
12 xadversariali ← xi + gξ(xi)
13 θi+1 ← θi − αf∇θiL(fθi(xadversariali ), yi)
14 end
15 gξ ← g′ξ
16 end
17 return gξ
First, since we are assuming fθ and gξ to be neural networks, the equality constraint can be
relaxed into
θi = θi−1 − α · ∇θi−1L(fθi−1(x+ gξ(x)), y) (5)
where i is the index for SGD updates.
Second, the basic idea is to alternatively update fθ over adversarial training data via gradient
descent and update gξ over clean data via gradient ascent. The main problem is that, if we directly
7
using this alternating approach, both networks fθ and gξ won’t converge in practice. To stabilize
this process, we propose to update fθ over the adversarial training data first, while collecting the
update trajectories for fθ, then, based on such trajectories, we update the adversarial training
data as well as gξ by calculating the pseudo-update for fθ at each time step. Such whole procedure
is repeated T trials until convergence. The detailed procedure is illustrated in Algorithm 1 and
Figure 1.
Finally, we introduce one more modification for efficiency. Notice that storing the whole trajectory
of the gradient updates when training fθ is memory inefficient. To avoid directly storing such
information, during each trial of training, we can create a copy of gξ as g
′
ξ and let g
′
ξ to alternatively
update with fθ, then copy the parameters back to gξ. By doing so, we can merge the two loops
within each trial into a single one and doesn’t need to store the gradients at all. The detailed
procedure is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
4. Label Specific Adversaries
In this section, we give a brief introduction of how to transfer our settings to the label specific
scenarios. The goal for label specific adversaries is that the adversary not only wants the classifier
to make the wrong predictions but also want the classifier’s predictions specifically according
to some pre-defined rules. For instance, the attacker wants the classifier to wrongly recognize
the pattern from class A specifically to Class B (thus not to Class C). To achieve this, denote
η : Z+ → Z+ as a predefined label transformation function which maps one label to another. Here
η is pre-defined by the attacker, and it transforms a label index into another different label index.
Such label specific adversary can thus be formalized into:
min
ξ
∑
(x,y)∼D
[L(fθ∗(ξ)(x), η(y))],
s.t. θ∗(ξ) = arg min
θ
∑
(x,y)∼D
L(fθ(xi + gξ(xi)), yi)
(6)
It is easy to show that optimizing the above problem is nearly identical with the procedure
described in Algorithm 2. The only thing needed to be changed is to replace the gradient ascent
8
into gradient decent in line 10 in Algorithm 2 and replace η(y) to y in the same line while keeping
others unchanged.
5. Experiment
(a) 2-Class ImageNet
(b) MNIST
(c) CIFAR-10
Figure 2: First Rows: original training samples. Second rows: adversarial training samples.
To validate the effectiveness of our method, we used the classical MNIST [19], CIFAR-10 [20] for
multi-classification and a subset of ImageNet [21] for 2-class classification. Concretely, we used a
subset of ImageNet (bulbul v.s. jellyfish) consists of 2,600 colored images with size 224×224×3
for training and 100 colored images for testing. Random samples for the adversarial training data
is illustrated in Figure 2.
The classifier fθ during training we used for MNIST is a simple Convolutional Network with 2
convolution layers having 20 and 50 channels respectively, followed by a fully-connected layer
consists of 500 hidden units. For the 2-class ImageNet and CIFAR-10, we used fθ to be a CNN
with 5 convolution layers having 32,64,128,128 and 128 channels respectively, each convolution
layer is followed by a 2×2 pooling operations. Both classifiers used ReLU as activation and the
kernel size is set to be 3×3. Cross-entropy is used for loss function whereas the learning rate and
batch size for the classifiers fθ are set to be 0.01 and 64 for MNIST and CIFAR-10 and 0.1 and
32 for ImageNet. The number of trials T is set to be 500 for both cases.
The noise generator gξ for MNIST and ImageNet consists of an encoder-decoder structure where
each encoder/decoder has 4 4x4 convolution layers with channel numbers 16,32,64,128 respectively.
For CIFAR-10, we use a U-Net [22] which has larger model capacity. The learning rate for the
noise generator gξ is set to be 10
−4 via Adam [23].
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5.1. Performance Evaluation of Training Time Adversary
Using the model configurations described above, we trained the noise generator gξ and its
corresponding classifier fθ with perturbation constraint  to be 0.3, 0.1, 0.032, for MNIST,
ImageNet and CIFAR-10, respectively. The classification results are summarized in Table 1. Each
experiment is repeated 10 times.
(a) MNIST-Train (b) ImageNet-Train (c) CIFAR-Train
(d) MNIST-Test (e) ImageNet-Test (f) CIFAR-Test
Figure 3: First Row: Deep features of the adversarial training data. Second Row: Deep features
of the cleaned test data.
Table 1: Test accuracy (mean±std) when the classifier is trained on the original clean training set
and the adversarial training set,respectively.
MNIST ImageNet CIFAR-10
Clean Data 99.32± 0.05 88.5± 2.32 77.28± 0.17
Adversarial Data 0.25± 0.04 54.2± 11.19 28.77± 2.80
When trained on the adversarial datasets, the test accuracy dramatically dropped to only 0.25±0.04,
54.2± 11.19 and 28.77± 2.80, a clear evidence of the effectiveness for the proposed method.
We also visualized the activation of the final hidden layers of fθs trained on the adversarial training
sets in Figure 3. Concretely, we fit a PCA [24] model on the final hidden layer’s output for each
fθ on the adversarial training data, then using the same projection model, we projected the clean
data into the same space. It can be shown that the classifier trained on the adversarial data
cannot differentiate the clean samples.
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It is interesting to know how does the perturbation constraint  affect the performance in terms
of both accuracy and visual appearance. Concretely, on MNIST dataset, we varied  from 0 (no
modification) to 0.3, with a step size of 0.05 while keeping other configurations the same and the
results are illustrated in Figure 4. Test accuracy refers to the corresponding model performance
trained on the different adversarial training data with different . From the experimental result,
we observed a sudden drop in performance when  exceeds 0.15. Although beyond the scope of
this work, we conjecture this result is related or somewhat consistent with a similar theoretical
guarantee for the robust error bound when  is 0.10 [25].
Finally, We examined the results when the training data is partially modified. Concretely, under
different perturbation constraint, we varied the percentage of adversaries in the training data
while keeping other configurations the same. The results are demonstrated in Figure 5. Random
flip refers to the case when one randomly flip the labels in the training data.
Figure 4: Effect of varying .
Figure 5: Varying the ratio of adver-
saries under different .
5.2. Evaluation of Transferability
In a more realistic setting, it is important to know the performance when we use a different
classifier. Concretely, denote the original conv-net fθ been used during training as CNNoriginal.
After the adversarial data is obtained, we then train several different classifiers on the same
adversarial data and evaluate their performance on the clean test set.
For MNIST, we doubled/halved all the channels/hidden units and denote the model as CNNlarge
and CNNsmall accordingly. In addition, we also trained a standard Random Forest [4] with 300
trees and a SVM [5] using RBF kernels with kernel coefficient equal to 0.01. The experimental
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results are summarized in Figure 6.Blue histograms correspond to the test performance trained on
the clean dataset, whereas orange histograms correspond to the test performance trained on the
adversarial dataset. From the experimental results, it can be shown that the adversarial noises
produced by gξ are general enough such that even non-NN classifiers as random forest and SVM
are also vulnerable and produce poor results as expected.
Figure 6: Test performance when using different classifiers. The horizontal red line indicates
random guess accuracy.
For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we tried a variety of conv-nets including VGG [26], ResNet [27]
and DenseNet [28] with different layers, and evaluate the performance accordingly. The results
are summarized in Figure 7. Again, good transferability of the adversarial noise is observed.
(a) CIFAR-10 (b) Two-class Imagenet
Figure 7: Test performance when using different model architectures.The horizontal red line
indicates random guess accuracy.
5.3. The Generalization Gap and Linear Hypothesis
To fully illustrate the generalization gap caused by the adversarials, after we obtained the
adversarial training data, we retrained 3 conv-nets (one for each data-sets) having the same
architecture as fθ and plotted the training curves as illustrated in Figure 8. A clear generalization
gap between training and testing is observed. We conjecture the deep model tends to over-fits
towards the training noises gξ(x).
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(a) MNIST. (b) 2-class ImageNet. (c) CIFAR-10.
Figure 8: Learning curves for fθ
To validate our conjecture, we measured the predictive accuracy between the true label and the
predictions fθ(gξ(x)) taking only adversarial noises as inputs. The results are summarized in
Table 2. Notice 95.15%, 93.00% and 72.98% test accuracy is obtained on the test set.
This interesting result confirmed the conjecture that the model does over-fit to the noises. Here
we give one possible explanation. We hypothesize that it is the linearity inside deep models
that make the adversarial effective. In other words, fθ(gξ(x) contributes most when minimizing
L(fθ(x+ gξ(x)), y). This result is deeply related and consistent with the results from adversarial
examples [13] and the memorization property for DNNs [29].
Figure 9: Clean samples and their cor-
responding adversarial noises for MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
Table 2: Prediction accuracy taking only
noises as inputs. That is, the accuracy
between the true label and fθ(gξ(x)) where
x is the clean sample.
Noisetrain Noisetest
MNIST 95.62 95.15
ImageNet 88.87 93.00
CIFAR-10 78.57 72.98
5.4. Label Specific Adversaries
To validate the effectiveness in label specific adversarial setting, without loss of generalizability,
here we shift the predictions by one. For MNIST dataset, we want the classifier trained on the
adversarial data to predict the test samples from class 1 specifically to class 2, and class 2 to class
3 ... and class 9 to class 0. Using the method described in section 4, we trained the corresponding
noise generator and evaluated the corresponding CNN on the test set, as illustrated in Figure 10.
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(a) Clean Training Data (b) Non-label specific setting (c) Label-specific setting
Figure 10: The confusion matrices on test set under different scenarios for MNIST dataset. They
summarized the test performance of classifier trained on (a) clean training data (b) Non-label
specific setting and (c) label-specific setting.
Compared with the test accuracy (0.25± 0.04) in the non-label specific setting, the test accuracy
also dropped to 1.48± 0.21, in addition, the success rate for targeting the desired specific label
increased from 0.00 to 79.7 ± 0.38. Such results gave positive supports for the effectiveness in
label specific adversarial setting. Notice this is only a side-product of the proposed method to
show the formulation can be easily modified to achieve some more user-specific tasks.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a general framework for generating training time adversarial data by
letting an auto-encoder watch and move against an imaginary victim classifier. We further proposed
a simple yet effective training scheme to train both networks by decoupling the alternating update
procedure for stability. Experiments on image data confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed
method, in particular, such adversarial data is still effective even to use a different classifier,
making it more useful in a realistic setting.
Theoretical analysis or some more improvements for the optimization procedure is planned as
future works. In addition, it is interesting to design adversarially robustness classifiers against
this scheme.
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